It has been argued that the inherent conflict of interest from the issuer-pay model in the credit rating agencies (CRA) leads to rating shopping behavior, and ratings inflation. But the extent of rating shopping by debt issuers, and the CRAs ability to cater is unobservable and therefore difficult to empirically examine. In this paper, we exploit a unique setting in India that enhanced disclosure regulation requirements for CRAs to disclose rating shopping from issuer. We ask whether these increased disclosures have an effect on ratings shopping, and ratings inflation. We find that the disclosure requirements result in a decline in rating shopping, in a narrow form, where issuers get rated from multiple CRAs, and then strategically decide whether to report it or not. We also find that in the post-regulation period, issuers are more likely to approach a smaller CRA, but this bargaining leads to an unintended increase in rating shopping, in a broad form, where issues can strategically choose the CRAs that will give them a better rating. We document an increase in the incidence of an issuing instrument receiving an investment grade, with the results being stronger to the subsample of larger issuing firms, and smaller CRAs suggesting that the potential for future business induces CRA to issue favorable ratings to larger issuers. These results are consistent with the view that the enhanced disclosure requirements had an unintended effect, and that it did not achieve its objective in reducing shopping and ratings inflation.